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If I were asked to recommend a book about what people commonly refer 
to as “the meaning of life,” God and the Meanings of Life would be it. In ad-
dition to being clearly written and eminently readable, it does a masterful 
job of providing a broad overview of the contemporary literature on the 
topic. But this is not to say that the views Mawson defends are represen-
tative of the mainstream in the literature on the meaning of life. Much 
of the book is a sustained argument against the conventional position 
that “What is the meaning of life?” is one question that has one answer. 
Mawson maintains it is many questions with many answers. Moreover, 
also out of step with most treatments of the meaning of life is Mawson’s 
claim that God’s existence is relevant to the deepest understandings of 
life’s meaning. So while his book is an engaging way into thought about 
the meaning of life, it is a way that informs readers that most people writ-
ing on the topic are fundamentally mistaken. In what follows, I summa-
rize some of the main points of the book, and then interact critically with 
a couple of issues raised in it.
Mawson calls himself a “polyvalent amalgamist” about the meaning 
of life question. What is a polyvalent amalgamist, besides a mouthful? It 
is someone who believes the question “What is the meaning of life?” is 
ambiguous. In one of the clearest statements of his view, Mawson writes 
“polyvalence at the level of connotation is the thesis that there are a num-
ber of different legitimate meanings of ‘meaning’ and ‘life’ in the question 
of life’s meaning. When one asks the question ‘What is the meaning of 
life?’ one thus asks a number of different questions at once. And polyva-
lence at the level of denotation is the thesis that these different questions 
have different answers” (15). “[W]hen we see the different meanings of 
the question ‘What is the meaning of life?’ we can see instantly that some 
of them just must—of conceptual necessity—have different answers from 
others” (50). So “[n]o one thing can be the meaning of life” (49).
Part of what motivates Mawson’s opposition to the “monovalent” view 
of the meaning of life question is the sense of dissatisfaction that one typi-
cally has upon receiving an answer, where this is often expressed by some-
thing like “There must be more to it than that” (23). There must be more to 
it than that because there are many meanings of life corresponding to the 
many different questions being asked with “What is the meaning of life?”




One reason for thinking there are many different questions is that there 
are many different meanings of the words “life” and “meaning.” Consider 
“life.” There is biological life, and one might be asking “Why is the world 
one with life in it, rather than entirely dead?” (51). Or one might mean 
by “life” all that exists or “everything,” so that “What is the meaning of 
life?” means “What’s the meaning of it all?” (52). Furthermore, one might 
mean by life “human life,” so that one is asking “Why are humans here?” 
when one queries about the meaning of life (57). Yet again, one might take 
“life” to mean “my individual life,” and be asking “Why am I here?” (57). 
Mawson thinks it is evident that whereas one might believe that life in the 
sense of human life is meaningless because it is a product of blind, pur-
poseless causes, at the same time one might think one’s individual life is 
meaningful because one can as an individual either make something of it 
(57–58) or have a “feeling of fulfilment with some aspect of one’s life” (60).
What about different senses of “meaning”? Mawson usefully contrasts 
meaning as mere causal consequence as opposed to meaning as causally 
producing something significant or deeper (64), where one meaning is 
deeper than another if it is more desirable (17). While meaning as mere 
causal consequence is a necessary condition of more significant meaning, 
few, if any, of us care at all for meaning as mere causal consequence. Con-
sider, here, Andy, Bob, and Charlie. Andy has been rolling rocks to the 
top of a hill and stacking them into a pile there for eternity past and, by 
hypothesis, for eternity future. Bob is in the same situation temporally as 
Andy, but instead of piling his rocks, he uses them to construct an increas-
ingly beautiful, but never completed, building. Finally, Charlie has been 
rolling rocks for a Bob-like task for a finite period of time. What we learn 
from this example is that we regard Charlie’s life as more meaningful 
than Andy’s, even though the mere causal consequences of his actions are 
quantitatively less than those of Andy. Thus, we do not value meaning as 
causal consequence for its own sake but only for its being a necessary con-
dition of meaning as a positively evaluable causal consequence (63–64).
Mawson goes on to point out that one might also consider the question 
as a whole and ask competent language users how they understand it. 
Not surprisingly, there are multiple interpretations of the question. One 
might be asking whether there are any positively evaluable consequences 
of one’s life as a whole; whether any purposes are served by one’s life; 
whether one’s life stands for anything; whether there is anything that 
makes life worth living; and on and on (67).
To sum up things to this point, Mawson believes his “part-whole” ap-
proach to “What is the meaning of life?” is the best evidence for the poly-
valent amalgamist view (68). The problem “is not that the question of the 
meaning of life has too little meaning [or is ‘nonsense masquerading as 
profundity’]; it has too much” (71). But if “What is the meaning of life?” is 
so rich in interpretive content, can any interpretation of the question about 
life’s meaning qualify as a legitimate interpretation? Mawson believes not, 
principally for two reasons. First, logically incoherent interpretations are 
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illegitimate, since what is logically incoherent means nothing, and what 
means nothing cannot be a meaningful interpretation of our question (78). 
Second, a proffered interpretation must address our concern in asking 
the question. “We . . . are sovereign over the identity of [the] question” 
(81). Hence, someone who answers “Life is a fountain” or “42” has not 
understood a concern of ours when we ask about life’s meaning (80–81). 
Someone who answers “It’s to make money” understands a concern of 
ours (what is the purpose of our lives?), but this individual has given a 
false answer (79–80).
The polyvalence thesis recognizes that there are multiple interpreta-
tions of “What is the meaning of life?” Given these many interpretations, 
Mawson believes there is a hierarchy of higher and lower senses of mean-
ingfulness: the higher a sense of meaningfulness on the list, the more 
deeply we are concerned about it. Mawson believes “it is our individual 
lives that are the main focus of our concerns when we ask ‘What is the 
meaning of life?’” (60). It is thus higher on the list than interpretations 
that concentrate on life in broader senses. Moreover, the different senses 
of “the meaning of life” which are concerned with us as individuals are 
connected. They cluster or cohere together in certain ways, so that a grab-
bag approach is false and the amalgam thesis is true (85–97). Principles 
of clustering include logical implication (e.g., “where an individual’s life 
having meaning in sense a strictly implies that it has meaning in sense b” 
[98]). But not only do different sorts of meaning amalgamate in certain 
ways, so also do instances of the same kind of meaningfulness. For ex-
ample, if every moment of a person’s life seems to be meaningful to him 
in the sense that life seems to be worth going on, then that individual’s life 
as a whole is meaningful in the same sense. In this instance, there is no 
fallacy of composition (107).
Given polyvalence, and sticking with the idea of life as one’s own in-
dividual life, the possibility arises that not all of the many understand-
ings of the meaning of life can be satisfied. Mawson’s go-to example pits 
“What is the meaning of life?” understood as “What is the purpose of 
my life?,” where it is answered in terms of a purpose of life bestowed by 
God (1) that is actually achieved (9), against meaningfulness as Sartrean 
dignity, which is explained in terms of self-creative autonomy (111). With 
divinely-bestowed purpose, one can add meaningfulness to one’s life by 
“appropriating to oneself the purposes that God has given one,” where 
a God-given purpose “adds to [meaningfulness] in the sense of allowing 
one to see aspects of one’s life as fulfilling a part in some appropriate larger 
scheme of things. And it adds to it in the sense of allowing one to find a 
meaningfulness for oneself in these purposes, and . . . to feel a certain sort 
of satisfaction from fulfilling these purposes” (132). Mawson makes clear 
that Sartrean dignity is not in conflict with having a God-imposed pur-
pose because the latter is not in itself, as some have claimed, degrading. 
God’s purpose, even though not degrading and, indeed, life-enhancing, 
conflicts with Sartrean dignity because it limits our self-creative autonomy 
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(116–120). “Sartre’s view then seems to be that we can have meaning in our 
lives, but only to the extent that we put it in ourselves. If there had been a 
God ‘putting it in for us’, that would have detracted from our ability to put 
it in ourselves. The more meaning [purpose] prescribed [for us] by God, 
the less meaning unconstrainedly chosen by us, and thus the less meaning 
for us [even if there is more meaning for God]” (1). So “these two sorts of 
meaningfulness [are] . . . related conceptually to one another such that one 
can only have one to the extent that one lacks the other” (129). Therefore, 
even if some meanings of life amalgamate, not all do so.
Mawson’s solution to a resultant “one-can’t-have-it-all” problem is to 
make clear that some meanings of life are more valuable than others. The 
result is that while “there could be meaning in our world even were it 
a Godless world, there could be more and deeper sorts of meaning in it 
were it a Godly one” (17). God, in Mawson’s view, “ends up bringing more 
to the party (or, if you will, afterparty) . . . than He takes away . . . through 
giving us eternal life,” because heavenly eternal life, whose existence is 
affirmed by theism but denied by atheism (139), “keeps the meanings of 
life we have ante-mortem going; going infinitely; and going infinitely for 
us” (17). This quantitative point (141) is most significant for us because 
we desire that we enjoy a maximally desirable existence that is everlasting 
(153–154). “In short, while life is meaningful in many senses—and many 
deep senses—regardless of what, if anything, happens to us after death, 
in giving us [having us experience] the right sort of immortality—Heaven 
[which is a maximally desirable post-mortem existence]—God makes our 
lives as finite ante-mortem plus potentially post-mortem wholes more mean-
ingful overall (than our lives would have been had they simply been our 
finite ante-mortem lives)” (141). But there is also a qualitative issue involved 
concerning meanings of life. Significance meaning is that which involves 
the bringing about of significant positively evaluable consequences (148). 
Given post-mortem existence of the kind just described, God provides for 
us ultimate significance meaning (149). Mawson believes ultimate sig-
nificance meaning is a deeper (qualitatively better) form of meaning than 
Sartrean self-creative autonomy. He concludes that “insofar as I try just 
to think clear-headedly of the values that feature on the chart/list of the 
meanings of life and choose by reference to those so as to make my exis-
tence as overall meaningful as possible, I retain a relatively high degree 
of confidence that I’d be choosing correctly if I chose immortality. I think 
Sartre would choose mortality” (155). Mawson acknowledges he would 
make his choice, while fully recognizing that given God’s existence “it’s 
metaphysically impossible for any of us to have fully meaningful lives 
in the Sartrean sense and that is, in itself, bad for us” (122). He concludes 
that at this point he fears “we may be down to a temperamental difference 
again, that in this argument we have reached bedrock and our spade is 
turned” (155).
Like Mawson, I am a theistic polyvalent amalgamist, though I didn’t 
have “polyvalent amalgamist” in my limited vocabulary until I read 
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Mawson’s book. In concluding this review, I first share some thoughts 
about what atheists and agnostics often give as a response to theistic 
views of the meaning of life. I then explain one issue on which I part ways 
with Mawson.
When Mawson appeals to the idea of the heavenly afterlife as the 
“more” which God brings to the meaning of life, he is invoking a vari-
ant of an idea now commonly referred to in the philosophical literature 
on life’s meaning as the “perfection thesis.” The perfection thesis is often 
regarded as the claim that a final perfect existence is required for meaning 
in an individual’s life. However, Mawson states clearly at several points in 
his book that he believes there can be meaning in one form or another in 
an individual’s life, even if death brings a permanent end to a person’s ex-
istence. What Mawson believes, and I think reasonably so, is that if there 
is no final perfect existence in the form of perfect happiness, the beatific 
vision, etc., then an individual’s life is ultimately meaningless/absurd. Why 
is he convinced this is the case? If I understand him correctly, it is because 
this kind of final existence, which is quantitatively and qualitatively the 
deepest form of meaning, is what we desire. And if this desire is not ful-
filled, then life in the end is meaningless. Thus, it is the idea of desire and 
its fulfillment that informs Mawson’s claim that God brings more to the 
table than atheism when it comes to the meaning of life.
An atheist might respond that he or she doesn’t have the desire for this 
kind of perfect existence. While Mawson concedes this response might 
reflect a matter of temperament, in fact he finds it hard to believe: “How 
could a maximally desirable existence not be one that it was desirable to 
continue?” (142). Perhaps it is because it is hard to answer this question 
that many argue that death is needed to make life meaningful. For ex-
ample, some claim we would have no reason to do something today, if 
we could always put it off until tomorrow. Mawson quotes Victor Frankl’s 
claim that “[i]f we were immortal, we could legitimately postpone every 
action forever. . . . But in the face of death as absolute finis . . . we are 
under the imperative of utilizing our lifetimes to the utmost” (182n47). 
As Mawson points out, this gets things backwards: “Things that are in-
herently worth doing are things one is prima facie reasonable in doing 
now just in virtue of that inherent worth. One needs countervailing reason 
to delay doing them, not reason (beyond their inherent worth) for doing 
them” (182n47).
I think Mawson’s response to Frankl is basically correct. Rather than 
needing a reason to do today what could be done tomorrow or the next 
day, once we recognize something that is intrinsically good, we need some 
reason to delay the pursuit of it. Mawson seems to believe the primary 
locus of this inherent worth is action. This leads to my second point, which 
constitutes a disagreement between Mawson and me. Unlike Mawson, I 
believe the primary locus of inherent worth is passion, not action. I believe 
this because I believe the primary intrinsic good is the experience of plea-
sure. Hence, it is for the experience of pleasure that we first and foremost 
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need a reason to delay. Because this is part of my temperament, I find it 
hard to agree with Mawson and Sartre about the value of self-creative 
autonomy. Mawson writes that “Sartrean meaningfulness” is “a sense of 
meaningfulness that in and of itself we rightly value” (123). However, I do 
not regard self-creative autonomy as an intrinsic good. It seems to me to 
have no more than instrumental value. This is because what I ultimately 
value is perfect happiness, and I think of it as experiences of nothing but 
pleasure (disclosure: while I am not a hedonist, I am a hedonist about 
happiness). Thus, were I to be perfectly happy, I would not care the least 
about possessing self-creative autonomy or free will. I value having free 
will and, by implication, self-creative autonomy only to the extent that it 
provides me with good reason to think and hope that I might be able to 
do something to remove myself from a situation in life that is less than ap-
pealing. But perfect happiness could never be to any degree unappealing. 
Moreover, it is because I think of perfect happiness as the experience of 
nothing but pleasure that I am unpersuaded by the objection (standardly 
traced to Bernard Williams) that eternal bliss would become boring. How 
could the experience of pleasure be boring? Mawson also finds the “bore-
dom” objection wanting: “And surely worshipping God in the full glory 
of the beatific vision would not be boredom-worthy” (141). Absolutely so. 
But I believe it is the pleasurable nature of that vision that makes clear 
why it could not be boring.
It is because I part ways with Mawson (and Sartre) about the value of 
self-creative autonomy that I in the end part ways with his polyvalent 
amalgamist view that not all of the deeply valuable meanings of life are 
jointly satisfiable. I believe that not having meaning in the Sartrean sense 
in the heavenly end that is perfect happiness would not in any respect be 
bad for us. What would be bad for us is my failing to commend once again 
Mawson’s book. It is the gold standard among works on the meaning of life.
Kierkegaard’s God and the Good Life , edited by Stephen Minister, J. Aaron 
Simmons, and Michael Strawser. Indiana University Press, 2017. Pp. 
xx + 272. $ 90 (hardback), $ 40 (paperback).
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Kierkegaard’s God and the Good Life presents recent work on love, faith, re-
sponsibility, and well-being in Kierkegaard. Several of the essays engage 
somewhat unusual topics in the context of Kierkegaardian ethics, includ-
ing early Christianity (Irenaeus and Clement of Alexandria), Google, 
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